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1.  Introduction 
Ever since the famous debate between Keynes (1929) and Ohlin (1929), movements 
in the terms of trade and its impact on welfare have been a central issue in the study of the 
transfer problem. Keynes claimed that aid can alter the donor’s terms of trade and therefore 
welfare.  Ohlin questioned this line of reasoning.  If aid can result in the terms of trade to 
favour the donor country, a paradoxical result , donor enrichment and recipient 
impoverishment, given by Leontief (1936) may arise. However, assuming market stability, 
Samuelson (1952) showed that the welfare of the donor decreases while the welfare of the 
recipient increases, regardless of the direction of shift in the terms of trade (which may be 
induced, for example, by a transfer). Later research nevertheless established that the transfer 
paradox can still happen in a stable economy with either more than two countries or in the 
presence of distortions.1 Subsequently, the research on international transfers has been 
focused to find specific distortions that can cause transfer paradox. 
Bhagwati, et al. (1985) classify distortions into exogenous and (transfer-induced) 
endogenous distortions.  The literature related to exogenous distortions includes Bhagwati 
(1971) on distortions and welfare, Brecher and Bhagwati (1982) on a production externality, 
Brecher (1974) and Beladi (1990) on unemployment, and Choi and Yu (1987) on variable 
returns to scale. In addition, exogenous distortions may arise from government policy 
interventions. For example, tariffs distort the importable sector of the economy. In this 
setting, as shown by Ohyama (1974), Jones (1985) and Yano and Nugent (1999), transfers 
can lower the recipient’s welfare because it aggravates the tariff distortion in the importable 
sector.  
As far as endogenous distortions induced by transfers are concerned, there exist two 
lines of thought that have been considered:  rent-seeking and tied aid. The former activity may 
be unproductive, as pointed out by Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1980), and therefore aid may be 
wasted, while the latter imposes a restriction on usage of aid, reduc ing the flexibility in the 
recipient country. For example, Kemp and Kojima (1985) and Schweinberger (1990) discuss 
the case of tying aid to consumption. This forced expenditure pattern can be immiserizing for  
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the recipient country. Recently, Lahiri and Raimondos (1995) consider aid tied to purchases 
of the importable good, which is under a quota restriction. Although aid in this form mitigates 
the trade distortion, the paradox of donor enrichment and recipient impoverishment may still 
arise. Chao and Yu (2001) extend their tied-aid model to a dynamic setting by focusing on the 
impact of tied aid on capital accumulation.2 Although tied aid brings a direct gain, it also 
causes a decline in the stock of capital.  The welfare effect of tied aid depends on the direct 
gain of aid and the induced loss of capital decumulation; therefore the overall effect is 
ambiguous in a dynamic setting.  
The purpose of this paper is to employ a simulation method to investigate the welfare 
implication of aid tied to a purchase of quota-restricted imports in a dynamic economy. To 
highlight the role played by capital accumulation, a production externality arising from the 
capital stock is explicitly incorporated in the production function. This externality was first 
considered by Arrow (1962) in a growth framework, in which knowledge creation is a side 
product of investment. Essentially, each firm’s knowledge is a public good so that firm can 
have free access to it. Romer (1986, 1989) extended this insight to model endogenous growth. 
Barro and Sala -i-Martin (2003) provide a comprehensive survey of this literature.3  We will 
show that accumulation of capital is positively related to the price of the quota-restricted 
foreign good. Aid tied for purchasing the foreign good can lower its relative price and hence 
capital accumulation in the economy, if the tying ratio is substantial.  This suggests that to 
avoid the fall in the capital stock, tightening import quota (i.e., zero quota) is optimal when a 
large capital externality is present. Thus, tied aid for relaxing quota may immiserize the 
recipient country. On the contrary, the optimal level of import quota is large when the capital 
externality is low. In this case, tied aid that relaxes the quota restriction can be welfare 
improving if the initial level of quota is set too low.  
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides a discrete-time dynamic model 
of trade and foreign aid. Section 3 uses a simulation method to examine optimal quota 
structures under various capital externalities and its welfare implications of tied aid.  Section 
4 provides conclusions. 
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2.  The model 
 Consider a two-country model and each country produces two goods: an agricultural 
good X and a manufactured good Y. The home country exports good X and imports good Y. 
There are no restrictions on the exports of good X but a quota Q is imposed by the home 
country on the imports of good Y. This quota restriction limits the exports of good Y by the 
foreign country.4  It is also assumed that the home country receives an aid, denoted by T, from 
the foreign country. To increase the exports beyond the quota level, the foreign country 
requires the home country to use t portion of the aid to purchase more good Y. Total supply of 
good Y in the domestic economy therefore consists of domestic production, import quota and 
tied-aid purchase (i.e., Y + Q + tT). This form of tying aid to imports was first discussed in 
Lahiri and Raimondos (1995) in a static model.  This paper extends their model to a dynamic 
analysis with capital accumulation. 
 
2.1. Firms  
  The domestic firms produce goods X and Y by using labour (Li) and capital (Ki).  
Total capital (K-1) is inherited from the past and it can be allocated freely between sectors at 
the beginning of the period, i.e., K-1 = KX + KY. As expressed in Romer (1986, 1989), total 
capital serves as a proxy for knowledge in the economy, and it yields a positive externality to 
the production of the manufactured good Y. The production functions are specified in the 
Cobb-Douglas form:  
21 aa
XXX KLAX = ,                               (1) 
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yyY KLKAY -= ,                         (2) 
where AX > 0, AY > 0, ai > 0, bi > 0, for i = 1, 2, and a1 + a2 < 1 and b1 + b2 < 1 are 
respectively the total shares of labour and capital income in production of goods X and Y.  It is 
assumed that b2 > a2, i.e., the manufactured-good sector is capital intensive relative to the 
agricultural-good sector. It is noted that b3 ³ 0, capturing the externalit ies from total capital to 
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the global productivity of factors in the manufactured-good sector. The presence of this 
externality also highlights the role of capital accumulation in the dynamic model.   
Let good X be the numeraire, and the domestic  relative price of the manufactured 
good Y is denoted by p. The goods and factor markets are assumed to be perfectly 
competitive. Given the relative price p, wage rate w and the externality from K-1, the 
production sectors choose Li and Ki to maximize the returns on capital, i.e., Max X + pY – 
w(LX + LY), subject to (1) and (2). For a given state variable  K-1, the optimal conditions with 
respect to Li and Ki are:   
( ) wLLKKpALLKA YYYYXXXX == -+--+ 11111 2123212 /)/( bbbbaaa ba ,          (3) 
( ) rKKLKpAKKLA YYYYXXXX == -+--+ 11212 2113211 /)/( bbbbaaa ba ,       (4) 
where r denotes the domestic rental rate on capital.  From equations (3) and (4), the factor 
price frontiers are described by 
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Note that LX + LY = L, which shows the endowment of labour. Due to the flexible wage rate, 
labour is fully utilized in the economy.  We assume that there is no growth of the labour force 
in the economy. 
 
2.2. Goods Market Equilibrium 
Domestic households consume goods X and Y, denoted by CX and CY. By the Walras’ 
law, we need to consider the market of good Y only.  In the dynamic model, the manufactured 
good Y is used not only for consumption (CY) but also for capital investment (K – K-1).  The 
market equilibrium condition for good Y requires the equality between its demand and supply:  
CY + (K – K-1) = Y + Q + tT.                                    (7) 
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As mentioned earlier, T is the aid received in terms of good Y andt is the tying ratio for 
purchasing the quota-restricted good. Note that by letting the world price of good Y be p*, the 
value of the aid is p*T to the home economy.  Thus, tied purchase of good Y is tT described in 
equation (7). 
 
2.3.  Households 
Households set their consumption plan over time by maximizing their intertemporal 
utility subject to the budget constraint. The current utility function of households is chosen as: 
U(C) = C(1 - l)/(1 - l), where [ ] )/11()1/()1/(1)1/()1/(1 sssssss +++++ += YX CbCbC  represents their total 
consumption. It is noted that s is the elasticity of substitution between goods with 1 + s ³ 0. 
Here, b Î [0, 1] and b = 1 – b capture the relative preferences for each good, and l > 0 
expresses the inverse of the intertemporal rate of substitution. The intertemporal utility of 
consumers is thus specified as: W = )()1(0 CU
t
t r-å
¥
= , where 0 < r < 1 is the subjective 
discount rate of households. 
As for revenues, domestic households receive factor income from production and aid 
from the foreign country. Since each firm operates under decreasing returns to scale with 
respect to its production factors, it earns a rent.  Total rent, R = X + PY – (wL + rK-1), is 
assumed to be distributed to households (who own the firms). We assume that when 
households make their saving/investment decision, they do not internalize the positive effect 
of the capital externality in each manufacturing firm. Additionally, there are quota rents 
accrued to the domestic government, which is assumed to be returned to domestic households 
in a lump-sum fashion.  The budget constraint of the households is: CX + pCY + p(K – K-1) = 
wL + rK-1 + R + (p – p*)(Q + tT) + p*T, where p > p* due to the quota restriction of the 
imports of good Y.  Denoting m as the Langrange multiplier, the optimality conditions of the 
households’ program for CX, CY and K are: 
msss =+-+ )1/(1/1)1/(1 XCCb ,       (8) 
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Combining equations (8) and (9), the relationship between the good price and consumption is 
derived as: bCY/ b CY = p-(1+s). This gives total consumption: C = (CX/b)(b + b p-s)(1+s)/s. 
Substituting C into equation (8) and then using equation (10), the evolution of capital in terms 
of its rate of return is governed by 
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In steady state, CX = CX,+1 and p = p+1, we have :1 + r = 1/(1 - r).  Hence, the rate of return on 
capital is approximately equal to the rate of time preference.  
 It is worthwhile to note the direct impact of aid on the domestic price of good Y in the 
steady state.  Aid tied to purchase the importable good increases the supply of good Y by t in 
equation (7) for each unit of T.  On the demand side, tied aid raises revenue by p* +t(p – p*) 
expressed in the budget constraint, thereby increasing the demand for good Y: ¶CY/¶T = [p* + 
t(p – p*)](UXY – pUXX)/D, where D > 0.5 With the given specification of U, we have: ¶CY/¶T = 
[p* + t(p – p*)]CY/(CX + pCY). Consequently, the domestic price of good Y rises (falls) if the 
demand effect is larger (smaller) than the supply effect [i.e., ¶CY/¶T > (<)t or p*CY/CX > (<) 
t/(1 - t)].  The change in the domestic price of good Y plays a crucial role in affecting capital 
accumulation in equation (7) and hence welfare in the economy as a whole .   
 
3. Simulations  
 
3.1. Reference steady state 
On the basis of the above theoretical analysis, it is instructive to conduct simulations. 
At the outset, we calibrate the reference steady state. Initial values for sectoral outputs, goods 
price and total labour employment are chosen as: X = 0.5, Y = 1, p = 1 and L = 10,6 and 
parameters are specified as: a1 = 0.60, a2 = 0.10, b1 = 0.40, b2 = 0.40, b3 = 0.50, r = 0.05, s = 
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-0.50 and l = 0.50. The initial amount of foreign aid is set as: T = 0.01, and the tying ratio is 
absent (i.e., t = 0). We also assume that the quota on imports represents 20% of domestic 
output of the importable good (Q = 0.2Y), and that the world price of the importable good is 
equal to 90% of its domestic price (p* = 0.9p). 
Using equations (1) – (11) in the steady state , we compute the endogenous variables: 
CX = 0.329, CY = 1.2, K = 8.55, KX = 0.95, KY = 7.6, LX = 4.2857, LY = 5.7143, w = 0.07, r = 
0.0526, U = 2.473 and W = 49.4611. In addition, we compute the direct effect of aid on the 
demand for good X: ¶CY/¶T = 0.706. The eigenvalues in the neighbourhood of the reference 
steady state are equal to 0.4354 and 1.087. The local condition of existence and uniqueness 
are satisfied. As we will compare sums of discounted utilities when the convergence speed to 
the steady state may be slow, we simulated the model over 500 periods.7 
  
3.2.  Optimal  quota  
 
We first look for the optimal quota by starting from the reference steady state and 
then by fixing the quota at different levels. For each new value of the quota, the economy will 
progressively adjust to this new quota and converge to a new steady state. We will compute 
the value of the sum of discounted utilities of households and look for the quota that 
maximizes this sum. It should be noted that, in the reference steady state, the quota is equal to 
20% of the reference value of the output of good Y.  
1. Consider the case when the externality coefficient 3b  is 0.5.  Then the optimal quota is 
zero (i.e., Qo = 0), suggesting no imports of good Y.  When the level of quota is tightened 
to this level, the domestic price of the importable good Y immediately rises and then it 
decreases at a slow rate and converges to a value lower than its initial value (p = 0.974).  
This reduces the consumption of the importable good but raises total capital over time 
until K = 11.5051. Consequently, current utility falls as a function of tightening the quota, 
and it then smoothly increases and converges to a value higher than its reference value (U 
= 2.7196). The result of a zero optimal quota is due to the high degree of the capital 
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externality.  It requires a high price of good Y for accumulation of more capital. Zero 
quotas on imports serve this purpose. Under this condition, tied aid for importing good Y 
may induce a negative impact on welfare of the economy.  
2. As the capital externality gets smaller, the optimal quota becomes positive. We illustrate 
this point by considering the case that b3 = 0.10.8  The domestic price of good Y increases 
sharply when a lower quota is set. Then, it decreases at a slow rate and converges to a 
value higher than its initial value. Capital increases smoothly and converges to a higher 
value. Current utility decreases, then increases at a slow rate to a value higher than its 
reference value.  The optimal quota is then equal to 17% of the reference value of the 
output of good Y (i.e., Qo = 0.17Y).  It is lower than the reference quota (Q = 0.2Y). So, 
tied aid for loosening the quota restriction may mitigate the direct gain of the aid to the 
economy. 
3. As for the case in which the capital externality is absent (b3 =  0), the optimal quota 
becomes large and is around 0.24 time the output of good Y in the reference state  (Qo = 
0.24Y).  This is the best approximation of free trade that we can reach under the 
assumption of a permanent change to a constant quota. Of course, free trade is the optimal 
trade policy in the absence of externality.  If we relax the quota by increasing it from its 
reference value, capital will smoothly decrease over time and converge to a lower value 
because the importable good is more capital intensive than the exportable good. The 
domestic price of imported good immediately decreases by a big amount, then it increases 
at a slow rate and converge to a value lower than its initial value. Current utility increases 
at the time of the change of policy, then smoothly decreases and converges to value lower 
than its reference value.  
 
In summary, the optimal level of quota is inversely related to the degree of capital 
externalit ies. In particular, no imports are optimal when the externality is high, whereas free 
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trade is the first-best policy for the small open economy without the capital externality.  The 
latter result echoes the traditional wisdom on free trade for the small open economy. 
   
3.3. Tied aid 
In this section, we turn to the welfare effect of tied aid. For the following 
experiments, we raise the amount of T from 0.01 to 0.02 and then examine its welfare 
implications under various capital externalities. 
1. When the capital externality is large (b3 = 0.50), we obtain the following changes in 
welfare for different values of the tying ratio in Table 1: 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
When aid increases without tie, capital will smoothly increase over time and converge to 
a higher value. The domestic price of imported good immediately increases, then it 
decreases at a slow rate and converge to a value lower than its initial value. Current utility 
decreases at the time of the change, then smoothly increases and converges to a value 
higher than its reference value.  
 
These results are exactly opposite to those reached under a relaxation of the quota. Note 
that 0.7665 is the long run value of ¶CY/¶T. When t < 0.7665, the effect of the increase of 
aid is stronger than the effect of the relaxation of the quota, and we get the same 
dynamics as when there is no tie to aid. When t > 0.7665, the effect of the relaxation of 
the quota dominates the effect of the increase in aid. So, the domestic prices of the 
importable good and fixed capital have dynamics opposite to the previous one. When t = 
0.7665, fixed capital and the price of imports remain the same. Current utility 
immediately increases to its higher level. 
 
Aid increases welfare, but the relaxation of the quota decreases it. For t < 2.25, the first 
effect dominates. However, for t > 2.25, an increase in tied aid decreases consumers’ 
welfare. Of course, the more tied the aid, the lower the increase in welfare (or the stronger 
its decrease). The threshold ont, after which tied aid decreases the welfare of the recipient 
country, decreases with the magnitude of the externality. For instance for b3 = 1, the 
threshold is equal to 1.501. 
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2. When the externality is in the intermediate range (b3 = 0.10), the optimal quota is positive 
(Qo = 0.17Y) but it is lower than the reference quota (Q = 0.2Y). So, we expect to find 
results similar to those of the previous case, but with a slower decrease of welfare when 
the tying ratio t  increases.  The following result in Table 2 confirms this conjecture. 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
3. Finally, in the absence of externalit ies (b3 = 0), the free-trade level of imports is optimal. 
Tied aid for relaxing the initial quota mitigates the distortion on imports of good Y.  Thus, 
welfare of consumers increases with the larger tying ratios.  Table 3 provides the result on 
the change in welfare: 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
In the case when there is no tie , or more generally when t < 0.703, capital will smoothly 
increase over time when aid increases and converge to a higher value. The domestic price 
of imported good immediately increases, and then it decreases at a slow rate and 
converges to a value higher than its initial value. Current utility decreases at the time of 
the change, then smoothly increases and converges to a value higher than its reference 
value.  
 
 
 From the above experiments, we can conclude that for a small open economy with a 
quota restriction on imports, tied aid for importing more manufactured good can lower its 
domestic price and hence reduce the capital stock in a dynamic model.  However, tied aid 
unambiguously improves welfare since the direct gain from the aid always outweighs the loss 
of capital if any. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
Using a dynamic simulation model, we have examined the welfare effect of tied aid 
for a small open economy with a quota restriction on imports. The economy considered 
receives aid which is tied to purchase the importable good from the donor country. To 
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highlight the effect of capital accumulation, we have added an externality from total capital 
into the production of the manufacturing sector. Capital accumulation is positively related to 
the price of the capital-intensive importable good. Our simulation results show that if the tie 
of aid is substantial, aid can lower this good price and thus reduce capital accumulation. 
When the capital externality is large, the optimal quota is zero. In this case, tied aid for 
relaxing quota will lower capital accumulation if the tying ratio is large enough. However, 
this capital decumulation effect is not large enough to outweigh the direct gain from aid.  It is 
only for very high values of the tying ratio that tied aid will immiserize the recipient country. 
Further, when the capital externality is low, the optimal quota is large.  Tied aid that relaxes 
the quota is always welfare improving.  
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 Footnotes 
1. See Bhagwati, et al. (1983) for discussions. 
2. Brock (1996) considers the effect of un-tied aid on capital accumulation in a dynamic 
framework. 
3. This production externality arising from the capital stock is employed, for example, in Liu 
and Turnovsky (2005). 
4. See Falvey (1988) for detail. 
5. This can be derived by maximizing steady-state utility U = U(CX, CY), subject to the budget 
constraint: CX + pCY = I, where I = wL + rK + R + (p – p*)(Q + tT) + p*T .  Solving the 
optimal conditions, we obtain: ¶CY/¶I = (UXY  - pUXX)/D, where D = 2pUXY – p2UXX – UYY > 
0.  Note that ¶I/¶T = p* + t(p – p*).  
6. The important assumptions for the calibration are the relative sizes of both sectors and the 
difference between the domestic and the foreign price of the importable good. The amounts 
of import quota and foreign aid are also crucial.   
7. The model was simulated and its eigenvalues computed with the software Dynare, which 
was run under MATLAB. Dynare was developed by Michel Juillard, and can be 
downloaded from the website: http://www.cepremap.cnrs.fr/dynare. 
8. Changing the value of parameter b3 does not alter the reference steady state, which is the 
initial state of the economy just before the change in the value of the quota. 
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                                 Table 1. Large Externality (b3 = 0.5) 
t  Increase in welfare 
0 0.2368 
0.7665 0.1577 
1 0.1333 
1.5 0.0806 
2 0.0270 
2.25 0 
2.5 -0.0273 
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                                            Table 2. Medium Externality (b3 = 0.1) 
t  Increase in welfare 
0 0.1632 
0.7039 0.1582 
1 0.1556 
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                                             Table 3. No Externality (b3 = 0) 
t Increase in welfare 
0 0.1443 
0.7030 0.1567 
1 0.1614 
 
